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NATURAL GAS AND THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
Any consideration of environmental protection encounters a thres-
hold dilemma. Rationality requires that we abate, if not eliminate, pollu-
tion from the environment. A major contributor to that pollution is fossil
fuel production of energy. Yet, despite the desire to reduce such pollu-
tion, continued technological progress requires an expanding energy
supply. This conflict between increasingly stringent antipollution laws and
rapidly expanding energy needs can only increase the demand for natural
gas--cleanest and least polluting of the fossil fuels.1
Concern over the continued availability of this fuel makes relevant
an examination of the natural gas industry, its regulation and the en-
vironmental effects of that regulation. After a brief explanation of the
basic legal and administrative structure controlling the industry, this
discussion will focus on one particular aspect of that structure-govern-
ment regulation of the price-and its effects on the supply of natural gas.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
The natural gas industry is characterized by a long-term, interlocking
relationship of seemingly independent legislative and administrative
actions. Various state and federal agencies have been charged, under
numerous statutes,' with the task of regulating different aspects of that
industry. Because of this unplanned diversification of authority, any
particular legislative or administrative decision can have far reaching
and largely unforeseeable environmental consequences. Examples are
numerous.' However, because of its extensive jurisdiction over natural
1. See Hearings on S.R. 45 before the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 95, 96 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings] (statement of
Walter E. Rogers, President of the Independent Natural Gas Association of America) ;
id. at 64, 65 (statement of Sen. John G. Tower (R.-Tex.)). An example of the role
which natural gas can play in the nation's environment is the fact that a threefold in-
crease in the present rate of natural gas usage in New York City would enable that city
to meet minimum air quality standards. Roddis, What Is Inferior Use of Gasf, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Oct. 14, 1971, at 90 [hereinafter cited as Roddis].
2. Jurisdiction is exercised by a multiplicity of agencies, from state public utility
commissions to the Internal Revenue Service. An example of authority granted by fed-
eral statutes is the Department of the Interior's control over natural gas leases on fed-
erally owned lands. This control originates from the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30
U.S.C. § 22 (1970); the Right of Way Leasing Act of 1930, 30 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
(1970) ; the Acquired Land Leasing Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1970) and the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. § 471 (1970).
3. Consider, for example, the matter of the Alaskan gas reserves. The Merchant
Marine Act of 1920 provides:
No merchandise shall be transported by water, or by land and water, on
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gas,4 the Federal Power Commission has the greatest potential for long-
term environmental impact.
Congress has granted the FPC two comprehensive methods of re-
gulating the natural gas industry, both of which have direct environ-
mental implications. The first is the power to grant or deny the certificates
of public convenience and necessity required for any interstate sale and
transportation of natural gas.' By means of this authority the FPC has
the opportunity to effect long-range plans for natural gas usage. Although
the FPC is increasingly aware that this opportunity can aid in solving
environmental problems, its use of the certification authority for such
purposes has been slow in developing.'
The FPC's second means of control is worthy of more detailed dis-
cussion. It regulates the field price of natural gas, that is, the price gas
producers can charge interstate pipeline companies. The gas industry
contends that the FPC has unwisely enforced low prices for natural gas
penalty of forfeiture thereof, between points in the United States . . . either
directly or via a foreign port, or for any part of the transportation, in any other
vessel than a vessel built in and documented under the laws of the United States
and owned by persons who are citizens of the United States ...
46 U.S.C. § 883 (1970). Because American vessels are more expensive to construct and
operate, this requirement serves to double shipping costs between Alaska and ports in
other states. As a result, the huge quantities of natural gas available in Alaska prob-
ably cannot be economically transported to domestic markets. At the same time, other
states must import more expensive foreign natural gas to satisfy domestic demand. More-
over, about seventeen per cent of the natural gas produced in connection with Alaskan
oil drilling is currently burned at the producing well because the expense of processing
and transporting the gas exceeds the realizable price. Hartig & Norman, Production,
Conservation, and Utilization of Natural Gas in Alaska, 3 NATURAL RESOURcEs LAW
694, 696-700 (1970).
4. This jurisdiction was granted by the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717
et seq. (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970).
6. A major reason for this slow development is the FPC's adherence to a policy
position clearly stated in Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 12 F.P.C. 109 (1953) :
[T]he use of natural gas as boiler fuel [to operate public utility plants] is
an inferior usage and . . . , while it is not to be denied in all situations, it
should be permitted only on a positive showing that it is required by public con-
venience and necessity.
Id. at 112. Since fossil fuel production of energy in public utility plants, a major source
of urban air pollution, could be nearly eliminated if public utilities were allowed to burn
natural gas, the wisdom of this FPC policy position has been questioned:
The air in New York City . . . needs improvement. To do this, maximum
use of clean fuels is necessary. . . . Therefore, to the extent that gas can be
used for this purpose, it should be used.
Moreover, virtually all of the electricity in Con Edison's service area is
used for residential and commercial purposes. Even as with natural gas, this is
accepted as the highest end use. It is, therefore, hard to conceive that using
natural gas to produce a life-supporting product in a way that harms least an
already damaged environment is an inferior use of that gas.
Roddis, supra note 1, at 90.
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and that these low prices have caused a substantial increase in demand
for natural gas. At the same time low prices have removed the financial
incentive for private exploration and recovery operations, and thus dis-
couraged the development of new gas supplies. Consequently, this policy
has resulted in a critical natural gas shortage.' To examine this contention
adequately, the history of the FPC's regulation of the field price for
natural gas must be understood.
FPC jurisdiction over the field price for natural gas originated with
the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin.'
The Court held that a company which produced and purchased natural
gas for sale to interstate pipelines was a "natural gas company" within
the meaning of the Natural Gas Act, even if unaffiliated with an inter-
state operation. This unexpected decision9 meant that all rates charged
interstate pipelines had to meet a "just and reasonable" standard, which
was to be determined by the FPC.'0 Following the direction of Phillips,
lower federal courts soon upheld FPC assertions of jurisdiction over all
well-head sales of gas to be transported in interstate pipelines for later
resale." Although the sheer number of these sales created an administra-
tive nightmare, the FPC's greatest difficulty was in choosing appropriate
criteria for determining the "just and reasonable" rates required by the
Natural Gas Act.'
7. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 71, 75 (statement of Carl E. Bagge, former mem-
ber of the FPC and current President of the National Coal Association) ; id. at 67 (state-
ment of Frank N. Ikard, President of the American Petroleum Institute) ; id. at 96
(statement of Walter E. Rogers, President of the Independent Natural Gas Association
of America). See also Bagge, Broadening the Supply Base-A Proposal to Eliminate
Producer Price Regulation, 3 NATURAL RESOURCEs LAW. 430 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Bagge].
8. 347 U.S. 672 (1954), aff'g 205 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953), rev'g 10 F.P.C. 246
(1951).
9. The Supreme Court decision in Phillips reversed the FPC's own determination
that its authority did not extend so far. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951).
10. All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas
company for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. and all rules and regulations
affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges, shall be just and reasonable,
and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is declared to be
unlawful.
15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1970).
11. Deep South Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Saturn Oil & Gas
Co. v. FPC, 250 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958).
12. This difficulty generated a considerable amount of litigation and an even
greater amount of confusion about what should be considered when selecting a "just
and reasonable" rate. To take the Fifth Circuit as an example, see the series of cases
decided on Apr. 23, 1958: Bel Oil Corp. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 548, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 804
(1958) ; Associated Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 255 F2d 555; Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 255
F.2d 556; Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 255.F.2d 557. See also the two cases decided by the
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In 1959, the Supreme Court decided Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public
Service Commission8 (the CATCO case), which affected the FPC's
efforts to develop a workable system of rate determination. Initially, the
Court ruled that the proposed price for natural gas was a valid subject
for consideration in certification proceedings." In other words, one of
the elements determining "public convenience and necessity" was the price
at which the natural gas was to be sold. Secondly, the Court held that
any proposed price that exceeded the going market price in the area where
the gas was produced was highly suspect and, therefore, not consistent
with the public convenience and necessity, absent some showing of special
circumstances."
The FPC interpreted CATCO as an order to hold the line on natural
gas prices until a method of setting "just and reasonable" rates could be
devised. Consistent with this interpretation, the FPC developed the "in-
line" pricing guidelines which, in effect, froze the prices of natural gas by
requiring, in certification proceedings, that new gas sales be made at
rates "in-line" with those at which previous sales had been made. 6
Freezing natural gas prices was considered a temporary method of
Fifth Circuit on Feb. 20, 1959: Forest Oil Corp. v. FPC, 263 F.2d 622; H. F. Sears v.
FPC, 263 F.2d 626.
13. 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
14. What we do say is that the inordinate delay presently existing in the pro-
cessing of section 5 [rate-fixing] proceedings requires a most careful scrutiny
and responsible reaction to initial price proposals of producers under section 7
[certification proceedings].
Id. at 391.
15. Id. at 392-93. The Court premised its preference for low gas prices upon the
consumer protection role of the FPC. The Court also said: "The [Natural Gas] Act
was so framed as to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of pro-
tection from excessive rates and charges." Id. at 388. While CATCO did not explicitly
enumerate the "special circumstances" which would remove the taint from suspect higher
price proposals, it did offer factors which might justify higher prices in particular cir-
cumstances, including unusually high production costs, special construction costs con-
sistent with the prevailing practice or custom of the area where the gas is produced and
special urgent need for some quantity of gas at any price. Id. at 392-93.
16. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 27 F.P.C. 35 (1962) ; Continental Oil Co., 27 F.P.C.
96 (1962); Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 27 F.P.C. 449 (1962); Ohio Oil Co., 27
F.P.C. 551 (1962) ; American La. Pipe Line Co., 27 F.P.C. 792 (1962) ; El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 27 F.P.C. 1134 (1962) ; Standard Oil Co., 27 F.P.C. 1153 (1962) ; Skelly Oil
Co., 28 F.P.C. 401 (1962) ; Texas Seaboard Co., 29 F.P.C. 593 (1963) ; Jake L. Hamon,
29 F.P.C. 784 (1963); El Paso Natural Gas Co., 29 F.P.C. 1175 (1963) ; Placid Oil Co.,
30 F.P.C. 283 (1963) ; United Gas Pipe Line Co., 30 F.P.C. 329 (1963) ; Hassie Hunt
Trust, 30 F.P.C. 1438 (1963) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp., 31 F.P.C. 623 (1964) ; Union
Tex. Petroleum Co., 32 F.P.C. 254 (1964); Edwin L. Cox, 32 F.P.C. 1301 (1964);
Hawkins & Hawkins, 34 F.P.C. 897 (1965); Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 34 F.P.C. 930
(1965) ; Turnbull & Zoch Drilling Co., 34 F.P.C. 1001 (1965). The Commission's
method of determining the "in-line" price of natural gas was eventually upheld by the
Supreme Court in FPC v. Sunray D-X Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9 (1968).
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price ascertainment pending a precise determination of "just and reason-
able" rates. This fact, coupled with the practically impossible task of set-
ting prices on an individual producer basis, led the FPC to announce a
new method for rate regulation." Under this new method the country
was divided into large natural gas producing areas, and for each area a
ceiling price was set within which individual producers were to sell their
natural gas. The originally set "in-line" ceilings were to be gradually
superseded by new prices determined in area rate proceedings. The new
ceilings would be based on evidence relating to relevant economic and
geological factors of an area as a unit. Of special significance in this rate
determination process were data concerning cost of production.
The FPC chose the Permian Basin area of the Southwest"s as the
subject of its first area rate proceeding. 9 In 1965, after five years of hear-
ings, the FPC issued its determination of "just and reasonable" rates in
the Permian Basin.2" A dual-price system was created. One price, the
lower, was the ceiling rate for natural gas produced in conjunction with
oil recovery, and for gas coming from already discovered reservoirs. The
higher price was the ceiling rate for newly discovered natural gas reserves.
Reaction to the FPC's Permian Basin order included disagreement
with the rate-of-return method of determining ceiling rates and an accusa-
tion that the dual-price system was a form of price discrimination."' The
most serious objections were leveled at the price freeze aspects of the
order. According to opponents of the rate-of-return method, setting
prices on the basis of previous production costs tended to act as a long-
term price depressant.22
Relying heavily on the FPC's discretion and expertise, the Supreme
17. General Policy Statement No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
18. The Permian Basin lies in Texas and New Mexico.
19. Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR61-1, 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960).
20. Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR61-1, 34 F.P.C. 159, rehearing denied, 34
F.P.C. 1068 (1965). For a summary of the FPC's orders, see Fuchs, The New Admin-
istrative State: Judicial Sanction for Agency Self-Determination in the Regulation of
Industry, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 216, 220 (1969).
21. Kitch, The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases and the Regulatory Determination
of Price, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 191 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kitch, Permian Basin].
Initial judicial reaction was also unfavorable, though more narrowly based. Of par-
ticular concern to the court in Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), was
the question whether some details of the area pricing system, like discounts from the area
ceilings for natural gas of varying quality, adequately insured that gas producers could
recoup their costs with.a sufficient rate of return on their investments.
22. Given a maximum price, gas will not voluntarily be produced at greater cost
than the price allowed. Since the ceiling price is based on what the costs for production
have been, the FPC is unlikely to discover the need for higher prices without the ex-
pensive and time-consuming process of a new area rate proceeding. Kitch, Permian Ba-
sin, supra note 21, at 211.
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Court swept aside the criticism and upheld the FPC's order." The Court
gave the FPC an unqualified vindication. 4 The net effect of the decision
was to affirm the FPC's area rate method in toto, including the price
freeze aspects. After this case, the FPC proceeded to establish rates for
other natural gas producing areas of the country."
EFFECTS ON THE SUPPLY OF NATURAL GAS
The contention that the present price of natural gas has created a
gas shortage by stimulating demand while discouraging the exploration
for and recovery of new gas reserves is environmentally significant since
the abundant supply of natural gas, properly used, could reduce a major
source of air pollution. Critical examination of the merit of this conten-
tion can be facilitated by separately considering four questions: (1) Is
there a shortage of natural gas in this country? (2) Is the current price
of natural gas insufficient to stimulate exploration for and recovery of new
gas reserves? (3) If the current price is too low, is the FPC responsible?
(4) If the FPC is to blame for inadequate price levels, what are the
reasons for its policy?
Is there a natural gas shortage?
The commonly used benchmark for determining the adequacy of
the nation's supplies of natural gas is the "r/p" (reserve/production)
ratio. This ratio is computed by dividing the current remaining proven
reserves of natural gas by the current net annual production. The result-
ing figure is a very rough estimate of the number of years that present
proven reserves can satisfy production demands at present consumption
levels. The FPC itself has warned that the r/p ratio has been declining
continuously. Indeed, that decline has been accelerating." Industry re-
23. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
24. [W]e have heretofore emphasized that Congress has entrusted the regula-
tion of the natural gas industry to the informed judgment of the Commission,
and not to the preferences of reviewing courts. A presumption of validity there-
fore attaches to each exercise of the Comnission's expertise. . . [The Com-
mission] must be free, within the limitations imposed by pertinent constitu-
tional and statutory commands, to devise methods of regulation capable of
equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests.
Id. at 767.
25. Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR61-2, 40 F.P.C. 530 (1968) (Southern
Louisiana Area); Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR64-1, __F.P.C_ (Op. No.
586, 1970) (Hugoton-Anadarko Area); Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR64-2,
-F.P.C.-(Op. No. 595, 1971) (Texas Gulf Coast Area). The FPC's orders for the
Southern Louisiana Area were judicially sustained in Southern La. Area Rate Cases, 428
F.2d 407 (5th Cir.) cert. denied sub nora. Municipal Distrib. Group v. FPC, 400 U.S.
95 (1970).
26. In 1955 the r/p ratio was 22.1; in 1960, 20.1; in 1965, 17.6; in 1967, 13.3.
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presentatives have forecast that if the r/p ratio continues to drop at the
present rate, only 86 per cent of the nation's natural gas requirements
can be domestically satisfied in 1975 ;17 by the year 2000 the country
could be completely without domestic supplies of natural gas.2"
United States foreign trade data gives credence to the FPC's figures.
During 1968 and 1969, U.S. exports of natural gas declined by nearly
fifty per cent, to less than 0.2 per cent of total U.S. gas production. "
Imports of natural gas, on the other hand, increased 11.5 per cent during
the same period."0 Declining exports and increasing imports are char-
acteristic of a domestically scarce commodity.
Further support for the FPC's predictions is found in the restric-
tions announced by major buyer-distributor companies in the Midwest
and East on sales to new customers. 1 These restrictions are based on an
alleged inability to purchase sufficient quantities of gas. 2
Acceptance of the FPC's data leads to the conclusion that the nation
faces a serious and growing natural gas shortage. Not everyone, however,
has accepted these figures. Criticism of the government statistics rests on
two grounds. First, all of the FPC figures are compiled from the con-
fidential records of the individual independent gas producing and pipeline
companies and submitted by the industry's trade organization, the Ameri-
can Gas Association. Therefore, the actual validity of these figures cannot
be scrutinized.3
Aside from attacking the validity of the government figures, con-
-sumer organizations have also questioned the significance of these data.
In the past, the r/p ratio in the oil industry similarly declined. In recent
years, however, it has remained stable.2 4 To the extent that natural gas
Present FPC estimates predict a decline in the r/p ratio to 10.2 by 1973. 1970 FPC
ANN. REP. 51.
27. The Natural Gas Executives Forum, PUB. UTIL. FORT., OCT. 14, 1971, at 71.
28. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 96 (statement of Walter E. Rogers, President
of the Independent Natural Gas Association of America).
29. 1970 FPC ANN. REP. 52.
30. Id. Imports as a percentage of total U.S. gas production are still quite low:
3.5 per cent. However, this figure has nearly tripled since 1958. Id.
31. MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 J. LAw & EcON.
167, 169 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MacAvoy, Shortage].
32. Id.
33. Neither the confidential research data of these companies nor the exact
method by which this data is summarized for the American Gas Association
reports have ever been divulged to the Federal Power Commission. For purposes
of this report we have accepted at face value all industry-furnished supply data.
Hearings on Supplies of Natural Gas Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials &
Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 193-
94 (1969) (statement of Edward Berlin, General Counsel for the Consumer Federation
of America).
34. The r/p ratio for oil has stabilized at a level of ten. Id. at 194.
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and oil are similar commodities, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suggest
that increased usage of natural gas would likewise cause its r/p ratio to
decline to some stable level.s5 Clearly, the heart of today's controversy
over the FPC's regulation lies in a disagreement over the seriousness of
the natural gas shortage.
Is the current price of natural gas too low to stimulate exploration for
and recovery of new gas reserves?
If there is a natural gas shortage, it is not due to any present lack of
natural gas supplies. 6 While vast potential supplies of gas exist, their
exploitation is dependent upon private exploration and recovery. As noted
previously, the gas industry has complained in recent years that present
price levels are too low to encourage adequate exploration and recovery
activities.
Statistical proof would appear to support this argument. The price
of natural gas is thirty per cent lower per B.t.u. than the next cheapest
energy source.17 Since 1950, the average residential price of natural gas
has only increased twenty per cent, while the overall consumer price index
has risen more than 61 per cent.8
The influence of low prices on exploration for new gas reserves can
be illustrated by the recent history of "wildcat" drilling, which is done by
small, independent gas producers.
Wildcat drilling, one of the most sensitive measures of ex-
ploration activity, dropped an alarming 40 per cent between
1956 and 1970. During the last ten years, an estimated 200
drilling rigs have left the United States for more profitable busi-
ness climates in other areas of the world."
35. Id. Of course, the oil and gas markets are not completely alike. For example,
much more oil is imported than gas.
36. Current U.S. proven reserves of natural gas amount to 290.7 trillion cubic feet,
although this figure includes 26 trillion cubic feet of new reserves in Alaska which are
still economically unmarketable in other states. See note 3 supra. Tankersley, A.G.A.
Progress on the Supply Problem, PuB. UTIL. FORT. Oct. 14, 1971, at 25 (hereinafter cited
as Tankersley]. The FPC estimates that the nation has 1,227 trillion cubic feet of po-
tential natural gas reserves. 1970 FPC ANN. REP. 52. The United States, therefore,
has enough natural gas to meet requirements, even allowing for increased consumption.
37. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 119 (statement of Sen. Henry Bellmon (R.-
Okia.) ).
38. The Prospects for Natural Gas, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 14, 1971, at 104. One
indication of the economic impact of these low prices on the supply of natural gas is the
proposed importation of more costly natural gas in vapor form from Canada and in
liquid form from Algeria. Bagge, supra note 7, at 435. Despite the low cost of domes-
tic gas, higher priced imports are sought, apparently because they are required to supple-
ment an inadequate domestic supply.
39. Tankersley, supra note 36, at 24.
732
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Lowered exploration activity has resulted in lower amounts of new
natural gas discovered in the United States. In 1969, discoveries of new
gas amounted to 8.4 trillion cubic feet, down from 21.3 trillion cubic feet
in 1965.0
However, drawing too close a causal relationship between low prices
and low levels of exploration and exploitation is misleading. If low gas
prices cause declining reserves, one would have expected the nation's
proven reserves to decline when the FPC imposed "in-line" pricing guide-
lines in the early 1960's. There was no such decline until 1968."' Also,
during 1968 and 1969, both the number of new wildcat drillings and the
amount of gas discovered increased, reversing the previous trend. 2 In
short, while low prices undoubtedly have an adverse effect on the develop-
ment of supplies, that is not the only operative factor."3 The low level of
exploration for and recovery of new gas reserves is partly an outcome of
the existing intricate scheme of applicable laws and regulatory controls."
Low prices play a part, but not an exclusive part, in discouraging the
development of new gas supplies.
Is the low price of natural gas the result of FPC regulation?
If the price of natural gas is, in fact, too low, the FPC's responsibility
would seem to be obvious.
In the absence of area rates there would have been signi-
ficant increases in prices in new gas contracts, and there might
well have been significantly greater new reserve commitments,
during the 1960's. General increases in demands for energy,
during a period in which the supply responses in coal and oil
markets were less than might have been expected, should have
40. AMERICAN GAs Ass'N, GAS FACTS 11 (1970).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. For example, since natural gas is found associated with oil reservoirs, one such
operative factor is the profitability of oil exploration. A profitable domestic oil industry
encourages domestic oil exploration; in turn, extensive domestic oil exploration can lead
to more natural gas discoveries. Of course, the nation's oil industry is very profitable
at least partly because it is somewhat protected from foreign price competition by low
oil import quotas. This fact has led the chairman of the FPC to stress the importance
of low oil import quotas as a vehicle for encouraging new gas discoveries by maintaining
the quota-induced profitability of the domestic oil industry. MacAvoy, Shortage, supra
note 31, at 170. Another operative factor is the availability of gas leases for exploration
on federal lands. The American Gas Association argues that adequate exploration and
new reserve recovery is dependent in part upon price levels and in part upon the number
of public land lease sales. 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 110 (letter from G.H. Law-
rence, Director of Government Relations and Services, American Gas Association).
44. See notes 2-3 supra & text accompanying.
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led to short term price increases for new gas reserves. The gas
supply response might have been substantial. .. .
Most commentators who have decried the present price-induced gas
shortage have assumed that the FPC is to blame.4" However, an inquiry
into the assumption raises some doubts.
It is at least questionable whether the FPC's rate setting effectively
regulates the price of natural gas. Like the "in-line" approach which
preceded them, area rate guidelines are concerned with the price terms
of contracts between gas producers and interstate pipelines. This type of
control is incomplete because many unregulated, nonprice terms, such
as delivery points,4" payment procedures 8 and guaranteed minimum pay-
ments,49 can be manipulated to alter the price. Such manipulation can have
a cumulative effect of transforming the FPC's ceiling rate into a "ceiling
range."
If the price of gas to the ultimate consumer has remained low despite
such loopholes in the FPC's regulation, market forces have been partly
responsible." Empirical evidence suggests that the rates established by
the FPC are nearly equivalent to those that would have resulted on an
45. MacAvoy, Shortage, supra note 31, at 175.
46. For example, consider the following statement of Sen. John G. Tower:
The primary cause of the diminishing supplies of natural gas has been, in
my opinion, the short-sighted price setting policies of the Federal Power Com-
mission.
1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 65.
47. Interstate pipelines contract to purchase from natural gas producers certain
quantities of gas. The producers receive a set price per volume of gas when it is delivered
at a set delivery point. The further this delivery point is from the producers' wells, the
more transportation expense is incurred by the producers in delivering their gas to the
pipelines. If the pipelines want to increase the profits of the producers without paying
more for the gas, they can simply move the delivery point for purchased gas closer to
the producers' wells, thereby relieving the producers of a part of their transportation
costs. Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal Power
Commission, 11 J. LAW & EcoN. 243, 274 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kitch, Regulation].
48. Most gas contracts are long-term agreements that generally require the pur-
chasing pipeline to make periodic payments for gas obtained during the life of the con-
tract. By agreeing to make these periodic payments in advance, a pipeline can in effect
increase the price of gas because of the time value of money. Id. at 275.
49. The purchasing contracts generally allow a pipeline to purchase up to some
stated amount of natural gas during some stated time period. In return, the pipeline
must pay the producer for the gas actually taken during a particular payment period.
If an interstate pipeline wants to increase the dollar value of a contract with a pro-
ducer, it can simply guarantee the regularity of minimum payments to the producer ir-
respective of the actual amount of gas taken during a particular payment period. Id.
50. One market factor responsible for low natural gas prices is the increased com-
petitiveness of other fuels. Coal, for instance, became more competitive with the de-
velopment of unit train hauling and mine-mouth power plants. Id. at 267. Indeed,
about two-thirds of all the natural gas sold in this country since 1945 has been sold for
industrial purposes at prices specifically designed to undercut the prices of competing
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open market. After a steady increase between 1953 and 1961, the average
price of natural gas leveled off at the very time the FPC began its "in-
line" price freeze.
[P]rice stability was achieved too quickly to be attri-
butable to the regulation. The in-line doctrine and the guidelines
froze the price at the 1959-1960 levels. The price statistics are
averages. Because of the long term upward price trend, gas flow-
ing under older contracts is lower priced. Each year the percent-
age of gas flowing under contracts entered into since 1959-1960
increased. Therefore the average price of gas should have con-
tinued to increase after the price freeze. The fact that the average
has been stable suggests that the price for new gas has declined."
Additionally, the nation's proven reserves of natural gas did not
begin to decline until 1968, long after the price freeze imposition. When
considering anything as complex as the natural gas industry, any one
factor cannot be selected as the sole cause of any phenomenon because
of the many interacting variables. FPC regulation has, of course, in-
fluenced the price of natural gas in an important way, but not to the ex-
clusion of other factors such as the operation of market forces.
To the extent that the FPC is responsible for inadequate price levels,
what are the reasons for its policy?
*Most actions of the FPC have been based upon two long-established
public policies. First, the FPC views itself as a consumer protection
agency whose most important task is protecting the general public from
the exploitation of unreasonable and discriminatory prices. 2 The Supreme
Court has cast the FPC in this role. Speaking about FPC's enforce-
ment of the Natural Gas Act, the Court has said:
The primary aim of this legislation was to protect con-
sumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas com-
panies."
fuels like coal and residual fuel oil. O'Conner, Reflections on Ten Years of Natural Gas
Producer Price Regulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 14, 1971, at 27 [hereinafter cited as
O'Conner].
51. Kitch, Regulation, supra note 47, at 265.
52. MacAvoy, The Effectiveness of the Federal Power Commission, 1 BELL J.
EcON. & MANAGEMENT SCIENcE 271, 273-74 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MacAvoy,
Effectiveness].
53. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944). See also FPC v.
Sunray D-X Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9 (1968) ; Atlantic Refining Co v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
360 U.S. 378 (1959) ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 374 U.S. 672 (1954).
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Historically the intention to prevent exploitative price increases was
not counterbalanced by concern over the effect low prices had on gas sup-
plies. This lack of concern was. the result of the FPC's second guiding
policy-the supply of natural gas is relatively unresponsive to price."
This rationale was based on the theory that since the total reserves actually
in the ground are finite, a higher price cannot increase the supply."
Availability of gas, however, depends on discovery as well as on existence.
Since exploration and exploitation are price sensitive, higher prices might
increase the amount of gas presently available for consumption. Yet, in
light of its two guiding policies, the FPC's desire to set gas rates at low
levels is not surprising.
It is interesting to note that the natural gas industry offered no im-
mediate opposition to these policy assumptions. Not until 1968 did the
American Gas Association, the chief representative of the gas industry,
actively support higher prices for gas producers." In addition, the in-
dustry has been unwilling or unable to supply the FPC with persuasive
evidence of the need for higher gas prices." If regulation of field prices
has in fact created a gas shortage, the FPC must accept partial responsi-
bility because of its adherence to unrealistic policy guidelines. Because
of their failure to provide the FPC with adequate information, however,
the producers themselves must also share the blame.
PROPOSALS
Instead of assigning blame for the natural gas problem, an attempt
should be made to explore possible remedial action. Initially, the FPC
could increase all area rate ceilings. Revisionary proceedings have already
54. Kitch, Regulation, supra note 47, at 245.
55. Id.
56. O'Conner, supra note 50, at 27.
57. With the gas supply shortage now so evident, we cannot overlook the fact
that in the past decade producers have not made candid disclosure of proved
reserves....
Along the same lines, until just recently, producers would not make avail-
able to the FPC the information requested with respect to intrastate sales ...
[I]t should be obvious how important such information could have been in the
past . ..
Some have advanced the principle, with which I agree, that income tax
data would probably have supported an increase in the area rates as prescribed
in the Permian and Southern Louisiana cases. Again, however, this informa-
tion was withheld by most of the major producer groups.
It is not necessary to recall how important costing concepts have been in gas
price determinations. Why, then, have producers not taken the necessary steps to
improve their accounting practices? In my estimation these practices have been
so inferior that regulators and producers themselves have often been at a loss




been instituted.5s The fact that these proceedings are taking place is an
encouraging demonstration of the FPC's willingness to respond to critic-
ism. More significant, however, is the fact that the FPC has cited, the
supply shortage to justify these proceedings.59 Hopefully, this indicates
a rapidly growing disenchantment with the inelastic supply assumption
and at least an indirect recognition of the environmental consequences of
its decisions.
Additionally, the FPC has effected regulatory changes that will
encourage exploration for new gas supplies. A 1969 ruling that new gas
discoveries in already known gas fields will be subject to the higher rate
ceilings for "new gas," 0 will hopefully serve to promote greater utiliza-
tion of known gas fields. Another order is specifically designed to en-
courage greater exploration by the interstate pipelines."1 Most impor-
tantly, the FPC has recently announced its intention to allow the price
for "new gas" to increase until it is substantially the same as higher-
priced alternate gas sources, such as foreign natural gas and synthetic
gas.62
Such innovations, however, are subject to two principal criticisms.
First, although the FPC has moved away from the inelastic model of
gas supply, no comprehensive theory has yet replaced the old model. Leg-
islation, agency regulations and even the market position of related com-
modities all affect the price and the supply of natural gas. In the face of
such complexity, scattered FPC rulings which increase prices for only
selected members of the industry are unlikely to solve the gas shortage
problem. A detailed and empirically verified econometric analysis 3 of
the price-supply relationship for natural gas is needed in order to under-
58. Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR69-1, 41 F.P.C. 378 (1969) (Offshore
Southern Louisiana, Federal Domain and Disputed Areas) ; Area Rate Proceeding,
Docket No. AR70-1, 43 F.P.C. 899 (1970) (Permian Basin Area).
59. The Permian Basin area was the subject of the first area rate proceeding begun
in 1960. In ordering a re-examination of the Permian Basin rates, the Commission re-
ferred to the inability of interstate pipeline companies to procure contracts for new gas
supplies at the presently existing low rates and implied that higher rates will be neces-
sary to induce gas producers to commit their supplies to the interstate market. 43 F.P.C.
at 900.
60. Op. No. 567, 42 F.P.C. 726 (1969).
61. The order provides that new gas found by interstate pipeline companies will be
priced according to the producer area rate method (yielding a higher price) rather than
the cost-of-service rate making method (lower price). Op. No. 568, 42 F.P.C. 738 (1969).
62. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 7, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
63. An effective econometric analysis would involve the creation of a statistical
model simulating the supply response of the natural gas market. The model could be
used to predict the results caused by fluctuations of economic variables, such as demand,
price, exports and imports, regulatory controls and the market position of related com-
modities.
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stand the problem fully." Such an analysis also should include environ-
mental considerations.
The second criticism of the FPC's response to the supply crisis is that
the entire regulatory process consumes too much time. Six years passed
from the time the FPC was given jurisdiction over natural gas prices in
Phillips to the time it announced its intention to establish area rates.
Another five years went by before the FPC determined what was "just
and reasonable" in the first area rate proceeding (Permian Basin). These
rates were not finally confirmed until the Supreme Court's decision three
years later. Rapidly changing market conditions require faster regulatory
appraisal and action.
The ultimate irony is that the effect of this regulatory in-
tervention is to significantly increase the market's unrespon-
siveness to changing conditions of supply. An increase [in
price] is slowed by the period needed for regulatory considera-
tion. 65
If a price increase is necessary in order to increase gas supplies,
time is of the essence. One suggestion for decreasing this "regulatory
lag" is to modify the entire focus of the FPC's regulatory control. Un-
regulated pricing, accompanied by surveillance of profits, would be
simpler and more quickly implemented than the presently used rate-of-
return approach. 6 Merely speeding up the FPC's method of determining
rates might forestall some of the undesirable economic consequences. But
the possible economic benefits would have to be balanced against the
potential losses involved in less pervasive and, therefore, less accurate
agency scrutiny of consumer pricing.
A more radical alternative is the complete abolition of FPC super-
vision over field prices. This alternative is based on the premise that the
cost of regulation is disproportionate to the benefits obtained. One study
has estimated that this country has incurred regulatory costs amounting
64. Some preliminary econometric models have been devised. See Khazzoom,
The F.P.C. Staff's Econometri,: Model of Natural Gas Supply in the United States,
2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 51 (1971); Erickson & Spann, Supply Re-
sponse in a Regulated Industry: the Case of Natural Gas, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGE-
MENT SCIENCE 94 (1971). At least one developed econometric model has been tested
against actual price data and has yielded the conclusion that there is a regulation-caused
shortage of natural gas. MacAvoy, Effectiveness, supra note 52.
65. Kitch, Regulation, supra note 47, at 277-78.
66. Two articles by Reuben E. Slesinger articulate a sample profit regulation
method and discuss its potential advantages. The Need to Modify Current Regulatory
Processes, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 8, 1971, at 38; Regulatory Response to Changing Con-
ditions, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 30, 1971, at 11.
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to about 33 million dollars per year in an effort to realize benefits which
may not actually have accrued at all and which, in any event, could not
have exceeded 51 million dollars per year."z
While economic data concerning FPC regulation appear discourag-
ing, noneconomic considerations must also be examined before complete
deregulation of field prices is effected. For example, the operation of the
free market might not alone assure that environmental and conservational
considerations will be furthered. Considering the still insufficient atten-
tion paid to environmental questions in FPC decisions, however, deregula-
tion of field prices would not necessarily be more detrimental from an
environmental standpoint.
Whatever actions are eventually taken, they must provide for resolu-
tion of potentially conflicting policy goals. Even the simple desire to pro-
tect consumers by enforcing low gas prices does not necessarily result in
their ultimate economic benefit. This is especially true if low prices have
created a gas shortage, thus forcing some consumers to turn to more
expensive alternative forms of energy."8 In order to determine what is
in the best interests of the consumer, the FPC must carefully examine
the long-term economic consequences of present price regulation. In re-
lation to the intricate problems of adequate gas supplies, satisfactory dis-
tribution and economic efficiency, the FPC should select those policy
goals which will best serve the consuming public in both the long and
short run.
Environmental factors also must be part of the FPC's long-range
planning. Due to its nonpolluting nature, the adequate supply and proper
distribution of gas is crucially important from an environmental stand-
67. MacAvoy, Effeetiveness, supra note 52, at 300.
Gas field price regulatory activities must be ten times more costly than
those in the "orthodox" public utilities; that alone should raise questions as to
whether the bureaucracy either in or engendered by field price regulation has
not grown too fast and too large.
Id. at 301.
68. Aside from the quantity of natural gas currently available, its distribution can
be adversely affected by low gas prices. Since the intrastate natural gas markets are
beyond the FPC's jurisdiction, low prices in the interstate market to some extent divert
natural gas to the unregulated intrastate markets where much of it is sold for industrial
purposes. In other words, the FPC's field price regulation has served to subsidize in-
dustrial growth in the natural gas producing states at the expense of consumers in non-
producing states. Address by Prof. Edmund W. Kitch, J. Law & Econ. Dinner,
May 26, 1971, in PuB. UTIL. FORT., July 22, 1971, at 47.
[RIegulation has had the effect of taking the short supplies and reallocating
them from home consumers under the aegis of the F.P.C. to the industrial users
buying in unregulated, more or less competitive energy markets. The home
consumer might well look to the regulator operating in his name and ask
whether some other rationale for field price regulation could be found.
MacAvoy, Shortage, supra note 31, at 197.
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point. Therefore, the process of rate determination should be carried out
with reference to what is environmentally wise as well as to what is
economically beneficial.
The FPC's potential for significant environmental impact should
bring the agency within the ambit of the National Environmental Policy
Act"9 ' (NEPA). This Act commands federal agencies to consider the
potential environmental impact of their decisions. Although the FPC is
not commonly considered to be intimately associated with the future of
the nation's environment, NEPA's broadly expressed congressional pur-
pose7" and its sweeping command to "all agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment" would seem to require that any agency action affecting the environ-
ment be made pursuant to the requirements of the Act.71 Since the supply
and usage of an environmentally important substance can have definite
effects on the nation's environment, NEPA should require the FPC, and
all other federal agencies regulating aspects of the natural gas industry,
to weigh environmental considerations in their decision-making processes.
In addition to the questions involved in determining the relationship
between the price and the adequate supply of an environmentally critical
substance, the FPC should ask several other important questions: What
is the environmentally optimal rate of natural gas consumption and con-
sequent supply depletion? How effectively do alternate pricing methods
secure consumption at that optimal rate? Which pricing methods best
distribute natural gas to those consumers who use it in an environmental-
ly desirable manner? These and other questions must be squarely con-
fronted if the FPC is to regulate the natural gas industry in the way most
69. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. (1970).
70. [Ilt is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all
practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to foster and pro-
mote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic,
and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
71. The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be in-
terpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chap-
ter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmen-
tal design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an
impact on man's environment. ..
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). NEPA has been construed by the courts to mean essentially
that every federal agency must consider environmental factors when dealing with activi-
ties which may have an impact on the environment. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199
(5th Cir. 1970).
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advantageous to the nation. The Interstate Commerce Commission has
recently ruled that NEPA requires environmental statements, answering
similar questions, to accompany all initial papers filed in any ICC pro-
eding. 2 The FPC would do well to follow this lead."
JEFF DAVIDSON
72. Ex Parte Order No. 55, U.S.L.W. 2526, 2527 (ICC Jan. 14, 1972).
73. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971),
aff'g 39 U.S.L.W. 2109 (FPC Aug. 19, 1970), remand of 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied sub noa. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), is a reminder that the courts may allow the FPC the same
broad discretion in environmental matters that they allow it in other matters of agency
regulation. Therefore, the task of effectively applying NEPA to the FPC's actions
will be primarily the responsibility of the FPC itself.
